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THE PATIENT IN FREE MOVEMENT LAW:  
MEDICAL HISTORY, DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS 
Barend van Leeuwen 
Manuscript 21-07 
Abstract: 
Free movement of patients has been criticised from the moment that the first patient cases 
reached the CJEU. The moving patient supposedly increases consumerism, reduces national 
solidarity and has a negative impact on the quality of healthcare provided in some Member 
States. This paper challenges the empirical foundations of such criticisms. An empirical 
analysis of all patient cases before the CJEU shows that a significant number of patients 
required urgent treatment, that their medical condition was life-threatening and that they were 
supported by their treating doctor in seeking treatment in another Member State. Moreover, 
free movement of patient cases regularly lead to positive changes to national healthcare 
systems. Therefore, the negative attitude towards free movement of patients should be 
reconsidered. Patients, doctors and lawyers have to think more strategically about how free 
movement can be used to improve the quality of healthcare in the EU.  
Keywords: 
Consumerism, evidence-based medicine, free movement of patients, patient autonomy, 
quality of healthcare  
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Dutch patient who wanted to receive a new kind of multi-disciplinary treatment for her 
Parkinson’s disease in Germany. An English patient who travelled to France because she 
believed that the waiting lists of the UK National Health Service (‘NHS’) were too long for her 
urgent knee operation. A Romanian patient who left her local hospital because of an alleged 
lack of basic medical supplies to receive cardiovascular surgery in Germany. The right of EU 
patients to receive medical treatment in another Member State, and to be reimbursed for their 
treatment by their home Member State, is very much ‘self-made’ – it has been developed 
through the free movement of patients and the litigation it has produced. The various cases 
brought by pro-active patients forced the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) to 
develop the free movement rights of patients, and these cases eventually encouraged the EU 
legislature to adopt legislation which confirmed and developed their rights in cross-border 
healthcare.1  
The patient in free movement law has received strong academic criticism from the moment that 
the first cases reached the CJEU.2 Free movement of patients was seen as an expression of 
                                                            
* Assistant Professor in EU Law, Durham University (UK). I am grateful to Emma Cave, Shaun Pattinson and 
Robert Schütze for the comments and discussions. 
1 Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (“the Cross-Border 
Healthcare Directive). See, for a detailed discussion of the Directive, S de la Rosa, ‘The Directive on cross-
border healthcare or the art of codifying complex case law’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 15. 
2 See, most prominently, C Newdick, ‘Citizenship, free movement and health care: cementing individual rights 
by corroding solidarity’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1645; V Hatzopoulos, ‘Killing national health 
and insurance systems but healing patients? The European market for health care services after the judgments of 
the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 683. 
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consumerism by patients escaping their national healthcare systems to obtain more advanced 
and often more expensive treatment in other Member States. Bringing these cases within the 
scope of free movement law fundamentally changed the nature of healthcare services into a 
commercial activity.3 Furthermore, the fact that patients asked their home Member State to 
reimburse medical treatment which they had received in another Member State reduced the 
solidarity between national healthcare systems and their patients.4 It enabled individual patients 
to escape the limits of their national healthcare systems to the detriment of other patients who 
were unable to do so. These non-moving patients ultimately suffered from the fact that their 
healthcare systems had to reimburse the costs of medical treatment obtained in other Member 
States. Finally, an extensive interpretation of the right of patients to receive medical treatment 
abroad could encourage Member States to reduce the entitlements of patients under their 
national healthcare systems.5 As a result, the quality of healthcare provided by national 
healthcare systems could be reduced as a result of free movement of patients. This critical 
attitude to free movement of patients has remained relatively unchallenged over the years. 
Moreover, the number of patients who travel to another Member State for treatment and then 
claim reimbursement from their home Member State is relatively low.6  
Twenty years after the CJEU delivered its first judgment on free movement of patients in 
Kohll,7 this paper will challenge the negative perception of the patient in free movement law 
on the basis of an empirical assessment of all CJEU cases in which patients claimed 
reimbursement for medical treatment which they had received in another Member State. Most 
of the existing literature has focussed on the implications of free movement law on health 
policy. The aim of this paper is to develop and broaden the perspective on the cases by 
exploring the role of free movement law ‘in the treatment room’. This will be done through a 
detailed empirical analysis of the cases. As a result, the focus of the paper will not be on the 
legal framework for cross-border medical treatment,8 but on the impact of free movement law 
on the patient-doctor relationship. By assessing the characteristics of the patient and the 
relationship with their doctor, the analysis makes it possible to provide a characterisation of 
the patient in free movement law. It will be shown that the characteristics of the moving patient 
in the EU are diverse and nuanced. Although there are some cases in which patients acted like 
consumers, in a significant number of cases patients did not have a genuine choice, and they 
were strongly supported in receiving cross-border healthcare by medical doctors in their home 
Member State.  
Moreover, it will be argued that a link can be made between free movement of patients and 
national solidarity. Through the exercise of their free movement rights, moving patients acted 
as explorers for their national healthcare systems. It was only because they were willing and 
able to pay for the treatment abroad before claiming reimbursement that a connection could be 
made between the medical treatment and their national healthcare system. Ultimately, in doing 
                                                            
3 Hatzopoulos, note 2 above, 688-694; Newdick, note 2 above, 1654-1656; G Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’ 
(2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 27. For a more recent perspective, see C Rieder, ‘Cross-border 
movement of patients in the EU: a re-appraisal’ (2017) 24 European Journal of Health Law 390. 
4 Newdick, note 2 above, 1658-1664. 
5 V Hatzopoulos, ‘Some thoughts on the fate of poorer Member States’ healthcare systems after the ruling in 
Elena Petru’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 423; M Frischhut and N Fahy, ‘Patient mobility in times of 
austerity: a legal and policy analysis of the Petru case’ (2016) 23 European Journal of Health Law 36. 
6 European Commission, ‘Commission report on the operation of Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of 
patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare’ COM (2015) 421 final. 
7 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie, Case C-158/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:171. 
8 In 2007, Tamara Hervey already analysed the implications of the early case law of the CJEU in the Cambridge 
Yearbook: T. Hervey, ‘The Current Legal Framework on the Right to Seek Health Care Abroad in the European 
Union’ (2007) 9 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 261. 
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so, they have also improved the prospects of patients who are unable to move to another 
Member State for medical treatment. As such, they have indirectly made a contribution to the 
solidarity among patients covered by the same national healthcare system. 
The analysis in this paper will proceed in four steps. First, the background to the analysis has 
to be set out in more detail. The three main criticisms of free movement of patients – ie 
consumerism, lack of solidarity and lowering of quality of healthcare – will be discussed (Part 
II). Second, the CJEU cases in which patients claimed reimbursement for healthcare services 
which they had received in another Member State will be analysed. For each case, the focus 
will be on three questions: was the medical treatment urgent, was the medical condition of the 
patient life-threatening, and was the medical treatment in another Member State supported by 
a medical doctor in the home Member State (Part III)? Third, the empirical analysis will be 
used to analyse the characteristics of the patient in free movement law. What were the motives 
of patients to receive healthcare services in another Member State, and what was the attitude 
of the medical profession in the home Member State (Part IV)? Fourth, the paper will outline 
the different ways in which free movement of patients has had and can have an impact on 
national healthcare systems (Part V). In the conclusion, it will be argued that free movement 
law has an important impact on medical treatment and the patient-doctor relationship. A more 
strategic use of the free movement provisions by patients, doctors and their lawyers can help 
to improve the quality of healthcare in the EU (Part VI). 
II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
Before we can look in more detail at the various free movement of patient cases that reached 
the CJEU, it is necessary to outline the three main problems with cross-border movement of 
patients which have been identified in the literature. First, from the judgment in Kohll, it has 
been argued that by bringing medical treatment within the scope of Article 56 TFEU the CJEU 
has encouraged a process of consumerism.9 Labelling free movement of patients as 
consumerism has two important consequences. First of all, it changes the nature of medical 
treatment. In order to be considered a service under Article 56 TFEU, the service has to be 
provided for remuneration. This means that medical treatment has to be regarded as a 
commercial activity which is taking place in a market. In many healthcare systems – in 
particular those like the NHS, which are based on universal coverage – patients never get to 
see the price of their medical treatment.10 Therefore, it is difficult to put an individual price on 
each medical treatment. Furthermore, the extent to which healthcare is provided for genuine 
market prices is different in each Member State. This is because some Member States subsidise 
medical treatments more heavily than other Member States, which have adopted a more 
liberalised approach to the provision of healthcare services. Consumerism means that 
healthcare services are being treated as regular services and that their special character is not 
taken into account. Secondly, consumerism also transforms the patient into a consumer. The 
patient is regarded as a consumer who is buying a service. As a consumer, the patient has a 
choice to decide where to be treated. Decisions are made on a rational basis, and are determined 
by questions about where patients consider that they have the highest chance of recovery or 
improvement of their condition, or where they might have faster access to medical treatment.11 
In other words, consumerism is about what the patient wants – not necessarily about what they 
                                                            
9 For a detailed and nuanced analysis of the consumerism argument, see T Hervey and J McHale, European 
Union Health Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 73-97 
10 See M Sheppard, ‘Treatments of Low-priority and the Patient Mobility Directive 2011, an End to Legal 
Uncertainty for the NHS?’ (2013) 20 European Journal of Health Law 295, 304.  
11 For a more nuanced perspective, see M. Flear, ‘Developing Euro-Biocitizens through Migration for 
Healthcare Services’ (2007) 14 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 239, 251-252. 
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need. As a result, the patient has become more independent from the medical profession. They 
are no longer relying exclusively on the expertise of their doctor, and they will often conduct 
their own research. The possibility of free movement increases the independence of patients 
and increases the number of treatment options available to them.12 
Second, it has been argued that enabling patients to receive medical treatment in another 
Member State has a negative impact on national solidarity. The rights of individual patients are 
improved at the cost of their national healthcare systems. Patients who are able to travel abroad 
for treatment often have to take a risk and pay for the treatment upfront before they can claim 
reimbursement from their home Member State’s healthcare system. As a consequence, the 
wealthy patient is able to escape the boundaries of national healthcare systems at the cost of 
poorer patients who are unable to move abroad for medical treatment. Newdick has articulated 
this fear most explicitly: ‘the Court’s jurisprudence of individualism in respect of national 
health resources is more likely to generate unequal access to care and a lack of trust’.13 The 
fact that healthcare systems end up having to pay for the moving patient has a negative impact 
on patients who stay at home because fewer financial resources are available to be spent on the 
national healthcare system. Although the individual patient may have been cured, other patients 
in the same national healthcare system will suffer. The possibility of free movement makes it 
more difficult for healthcare systems to make certain policy choices – such as keeping waiting 
lists for a certain kind of treatment – and to defend them vis-à-vis their citizens.14 Overall, 
individualism prevails and the choice of patients to receive medical treatment abroad is made 
for selfish reasons. 
Third, there is a risk that free movement of patients leads to a reduction of the quality of care 
that patients receive under national healthcare systems. This discussion has become particularly 
prominent after the accession of the new Member States in 2004. A number of recent CJEU 
cases came from these Member States. In cases like Elchinov15 and Petru,16 the CJEU 
continued to adopt an extensive interpretation of the right of patients to receive medical 
treatment in another Member State. It did not show much sensitivity to the national context of 
these cases, which all came from newer Member States that cannot spend the same amount of 
resources on their national healthcare systems as some of the older Member States.17 Because 
the right of patients to be reimbursed for medical treatment which they have received in another 
Member State is based on their entitlements under their home healthcare system, there is a real 
risk that Member States that do not want to spend more money on their healthcare systems may 
reduce the kind of medical treatments or the quality of medical treatment which patients are 
entitled to receive. In doing so, they would make it impossible for patients to receive medical 
treatment abroad which is not covered by the home Member State. As Hatzopoulos has put it, 
the CJEU’s approach ‘places in direct competition Member States’ healthcare systems which, 
by definition, have unequal inputs (fiscal and human resources) and outputs (quality of services 
provided). Under the current fiscal austerity conditions, such competition may only lead to 
downward spirals and to straining the relations between Member States’ authorities’.18 As a 
                                                            
12 Hervey and McHale, note 9 above, 82. 
13 Newdick, note 2 above, 1665. 
14 Ibid., 1661-1664. For a different perspective, see F de Witte, ‘The constitutional quality of the free movement 
provisions: looking for context in the case law on Article 56 TFEU’ (2017) 42 European Law Review 313, 329-
331. 
15 Georgi Elchinov v Natsionalna zdravnoosiguritelna kasa, Case C-173/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:581. 
16 Elena Petru v Casa Judeteana de Asigurari de Sanatate Sibiu, Case C-268/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2271. 
17 Hatzopoulos, note 5 above. See also T Sokol, ‘Rindal and Elchinov: an (impending) revolution in EU law on 
patient mobility?’ (2010) 6 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 167. 
18 Hatzopoulos, note 5 above, 430. 
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result, despite the fact that Article 168 TFEU expressly provides that the EU does not have the 
competence to regulate the delivery of healthcare services at the national level,19 the CJEU’s 
judgments on free movement of patients may indirectly put pressure on Member States to 
reduce the entitlements of patients under national healthcare systems. 
The strong criticism of free movement of patients is to an important extent caused by the 
approaches which have been adopted in the literature. They can be characterised by a health 
policy or public health perspective rather than a medical perspective.20 The main focus has 
been on the impact on healthcare systems.21 The empirical research which has been undertaken 
has also been conducted from that perspective.22 This paper will change the perspective by 
analysing the impact of free movement law on the patient-doctor relationship. The aim is to 
analyse the interaction between free movement law and medical treatment in the cases that 
reached the CJEU. In doing so, the paper aims to bridge the gap between EU law and medical 
law.23 The empirical approach will focus on the medical condition of the patient and the 
relationship between patients and their doctors. What role does free movement law play “in the 
treatment room”? Does it make patients more autonomous vis-à-vis their doctors? And what 
impact does free movement law have on how medical doctors interpret the concept of evidence-
based care? As such, the paper also hopes to inform doctors and patients about the (potential) 
role of free movement law in medical treatment. 
The next section will analyse all CJEU cases in which patients travelled abroad for the purpose 
of receiving medical treatment, and then subsequently tried to claim reimbursement from their 
home healthcare system. For this analysis, the legal basis of the cases does not matter. Cases 
brought on the basis of the Social Security Regulation24 and Article 56 TFEU have been 
included as long as they were about a patient who made a deliberate choice to travel abroad for 
medical treatment. Despite the fact that the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive had to be 
implemented by Member States in October 2014, none of the cases brought before the CJEU 
by patients were based on this Directive.25 Although its title – focussing on patients’ rights – 
seems to imply a rights-based perspective, the primary aim of its adoption was to codify the 
various justifications for restrictions on free movement of patients which had been developed 
in the case law of the CJEU.26 The Directive represents the outcome of a balancing exercise 
between the individual interests of patients and the interests of national healthcare systems.27 
                                                            
19 Article 168(7) TFEU. 
20 See, for example, T Hervey, C Young and L Bishop (eds), Research Handbook in EU Health and Policy 
(Edward Elgar, 2017); A de Ruijter, EU Health Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2019). The strong 
public policy focus of these books is also reflected in the emphasis on the term “health law” rather than 
“medical law”.    
21 E Mossialos et al, Health Systems Governance in the EU: The Role of European Union Law and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010); R Baeten et al, The Europeanisation of National Healthcare Systems: 
Creative Adaptation in the Shadow of Patient Mobility (OSE, 2010); H Legido-Quigley et al., Assuring the 
Quality of Health Care in the European Union (WHO, 2008). 
22 M Wismar et al., Cross-Border Health Care in the European Union (WHO, 2014). See also the special issue 
of Comparative European Politics edited by D Martinsen and H Vollaard: The Rise of a European Healthcare 
Union (2007) 15(3) Comparative European Politics. 
23 The term “EU medical law” is rarely used. This might be a direct consequence of the lack of competence of 
the EU in this area of law. For more background, see T Hervey, ‘Telling stories about European Union Health 
Law: The emergence of a new field of law’ (2017) 15 Comparative European Politics 352. 
24 Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. 
25 On the implementation of the Cross-Border Healthcare Directive in the Member States, see the special issue 
of the European Journal of Health Law: EU Cross-Border Healthcare Directive (2014) 21 European Journal of 
Health Law. 
26 See S de la Rosa, note 1 above. 
27 Hervey and McHale, note 9 above, 85-91. 
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The empirical reality, which shows that none of the CJEU cases so far were based on the Cross-
Border Healthcare Directive, might indicate that patients prefer to rely on Article 56 TFEU or 
the Social Security Regulation.28  
A total of twelve cases were included.29 Because some cases were joined cases, the total 
number of patients included is fourteen.30 For each patient, three questions will be answered: 
1. Was the medical treatment in another Member State urgent? 
2. Was the condition for which the patient received treatment in another Member State 
life-threatening? 
3. Was the medical treatment in another Member State supported by a medical doctor in 
the home Member State (at the time when the patient travelled abroad)? 
For all cases, the answers to these three questions will first be presented in a table. This table 
will then be supplemented by a narrative of the answers. The cases have been divided in three 
categories in chronological order. In the first series of cases (“the early cases”), the CJEU laid 
down the foundations of the rights of patients to receive medical treatment in another Member 
State. In the second series (“consolidation”), the CJEU further developed some of the basic 
principles and applied these principles to more specific legal issues. Finally, in the third and 
most recent series of cases (“further developments”), some of the new Member States entered 
into the picture. 
III. MEDICAL HISTORY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW 
 
A. The Early Cases (1999-2001) 
Case 
number 
Patient’s Name Urgent? Life-
threatening? 
Support from 
Medical 
Doctor? 
C-158/96 Kohll NO NO YES 
C-368/98 Vanbraekel NO NO NO 
C-157/99 Geraets-Smits NO YES YES 
C-157/99 Peerbooms YES YES YES 
 
The first case before the CJEU in which a patient wanted to travel abroad for medical treatment 
and relied on EU law in doing so was Luisi et Carbone.31 Ms Luisi was an Italian citizen who 
wanted to travel to Germany to receive various kinds of medical treatment. However, her case 
focussed on the restrictions on cross-border movement of cash which were imposed by Italian 
                                                            
28 See also D Sindbjerg Martinsen, ‘Governing EU Health and Policy – On Governance and Legislative Politics’ 
in Hervey, Young and Bishop (eds), note 18 above, 36-60. 
29 Kohll , note 7 above; Abdon Vanbraekel v Alliance nationales des mutualités chrétiennes, Case C-368/98,  
ECLI:EU:C:2001:400; B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting 
CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-157/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:404; V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO 
Zorgverzekeringen, Case C-385/99, ECLI:EU:C:2003:270; Patricia Inizan v Caisse primaire d’assurance 
maladie des Hauts-de-Seine, Case C-56/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:578; Ludwig Leichtle v Bundesamstalt für Arbeit, 
Case C-08/02, ECLI:EU:C:2004:161; The Queen (on the application of Yvonne Watts) v Bedford Primary Care 
Trust, Case C-372/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:325; Manuel Acereda Herrera v Servicio Cántabro de Salud, Case C-
466/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:405; Aikaterini Stamatelaki v NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron 
Epangelmation, Case C-444/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:231; Elchinov, note 15 above; Elena Luca v Casa de 
Asigurari de Sanatate Bacau, Case C-430/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:467; Petru , note 16 above. 
30 Geraets-Smits, note 29 above, and Müller-Fauré, note 29 above, were both joined cases.  
31 Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro, Case C-286/82, ECLI:EU:C:1984:35. 
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legislation at that time. She did not claim reimbursement from the Italian healthcare system. 
As such, no link was made between her medical treatment in Germany and the Italian 
healthcare system. It was simply about Ms Luisi’s ability to take money abroad to pay for 
various services, including medical treatment. For that reason, the case is excluded from the 
analysis. Similarly, Decker,32 a case in which the CJEU’s judgment was delivered on the same 
day as Kohll, is excluded from the analysis because it was brought on the basis of the free 
movement of goods. Mr Decker sought reimbursement from the Luxembourg healthcare 
system for a pair of glasses which he had bought in Belgium.  
As a result, Kohll is the first case which should be included in our analysis. Mr Kohll, a 
Luxembourg national, applied for prior authorisation for his daughter to receive orthodontic 
treatment in Germany. It is clear from the judgment that Mr Kohll’s request was formally 
submitted by a doctor in Luxembourg.33 As a consequence, it was supported by a medical 
doctor. Authorisation was refused by his health insurer on the basis that the treatment was not 
urgent and could be provided in Luxembourg. Despite the lack of medical urgency and the fact 
that Ms Kohll’s condition was not in any way life-threatening, the request for prior 
authorisation was supported by the treating orthodontist. In Vanbraekel, the patient was not 
actually Mr Vanbraekel himself, but his late wife, Ms Descamps. Ms Descamps went to France 
to receive treatment for bilateral gonarthritis (arthritis of the knee). There is no indication that 
her treatment was urgent, or that Ms Descamps had died as a result of the medical condition 
for which she had been treated in France. Ms Descamps’ main problem was that she did not 
have the support of a doctor who was practising in a national university hospital.34 It is unclear 
whether her request was in fact supported by a doctor working in a non-academic hospital.  
A year later, the joined cases of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms reached the CJEU. Mrs Smits-
Geraets had suffered from Parkinson’s disease for a number of years. Parkinson’s disease is a 
progressive illness of the patient’s central nervous system which ultimately leads to the 
patient’s death. Patients with Parkinson’s disease cannot be cured and the main focus of their 
treatment is on relieving and improving their symptoms. Mrs Geraets-Smits applied for prior 
authorisation to receive treatment in a clinic in Germany which provided “categorial and 
multidisciplinary treatment” for patients with Parkinson’s disease.35 This would require a three- 
to six-week admission to the clinic. Mrs Geraets-Smits’ request was supported by the 
neurologist who was treating her. However, prior authorisation was refused on the basis of an 
expert opinion by a Professor of Neurology from the University of Nijmegen, who had 
concluded that the categorical treatment was not evidence-based and that, as a result, there was 
no clinical necessity for Mrs Geraets-Smits to receive this treatment in Germany.36 In the end, 
Mrs Geraets-Smits never travelled to Germany for medical treatment.37 A similar discussion 
about the evidence-based nature of the medical treatment took place in Peerbooms. Mr 
Peerbooms fell into a coma after a traffic accident. He was treated in the University Hospital 
Maastricht. His treating neurologist submitted a request to the health insurer for Mr Peerbooms 
to receive medical treatment in the University Hospital of Innsbruck.38 In Innsbruck, Mr 
Peerbooms could receive intensive neuro-stimulation therapy, which was only offered on an 
experimental basis in the Netherlands to patients below the age of 25.39 Mr Peerbooms was in 
                                                            
32 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés, Case C-120/95, ECLI:EU:C:1998:167. 
33 Kohll, note 7 above, para 2. 
34 Vanbraekel, note 29 above, para 12.  
35 Judgment of Centrale Raad van Beroep of 20 July 2004, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2004:AQ5957. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Peerbooms, note 29 above, para 33. 
39 Judgment of the Centrale Raad van Beroep of 20 July 2004, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2004:AQ6215. 
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his late 30s and was not entitled to receive this treatment. If he did not receive the treatment in 
Innsbruck, he would be transferred to a rehabilitation centre in the Netherlands where no further 
treatment would be provided (and he would be likely to die). Mr Peerbooms’ request was 
refused on the basis that the treatment in Innsbruck was experimental and not based on 
scientific evidence. Adequate treatment could be provided in the Netherlands. When the case 
was brought before the national court, the same Professor of Neurology who had written the 
expert report in Mrs Geraets-Smits’ case was asked to provide an expert opinion.40 This time, 
he concluded that no adequate treatment was available in the Netherlands and that Mr 
Peerbooms should be allowed to receive treatment in Innsbruck. However, the health insurer 
maintained its position that the treatment was not evidence-based and would not be reimbursed. 
Despite this refusal by the health insurer, Mr Peerbooms was treated with neuro-stimulation 
therapy in Innsbruck and did in fact wake up from his coma.41 
B. Consolidation (2003-2006) 
Case 
number 
Patient’s Name Urgent? Life-
threatening? 
Support from 
Medical 
Doctor? 
C-385/99 Müller-Fauré NO NO NO 
C-385/99 Van Riet NO NO YES 
C-56/01 Inizan NO NO NO 
C-8/02 Leichtle NO NO YES 
C-372/04 Watts YES NO NO 
 
The next case to reach the CJEU after Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms was significantly less 
complicated from a medical point of view. Again, it was joined cased from the Netherlands: 
Müller-Fauré and Van Riet. Ms Müller-Fauré was not satisfied with the level of dental care 
provided in the Netherlands. For that reason, she visited a German dentist while she was on a 
holiday in Germany.42 She had not received prior authorisation for this treatment, which 
included the insertion of a number of crowns. Her treatment was not urgent, her medical 
condition was not life-threatening and she had not been supported by a Dutch dentist or doctor. 
Although the total costs of her treatment in Germany amounted to a total of about 3,800 EUR, 
she could in fact only claim reimbursement for a total amount of 200 EUR, as the costs of the 
other treatments were not covered by her Dutch health insurer.43 Ms van Riet suffered from 
pain in her wrist. The doctor who was treating her submitted a request for prior authorisation 
for her to receive an arthroscopy in a hospital in Belgium. The main reason for this request was 
that the waiting lists were much shorter there.44 There is no indication that Ms Van Riet’s 
treatment was urgent. Her request for prior authorisation was refused because medical 
treatment was available within a reasonable period of time in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, 
she went ahead and received treatment in Belgium.  
Ms Inizan’s medical situation was more complicated. She had been treated in Paris for many 
years for an incurable chronic illness, which caused her a lot of acute pain on a daily basis.45 
All treatments – including psychological treatment – had been unsuccessful. For that reason, 
                                                            
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Opinion of Advocate General (‘AG’) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Müller-Fauré, note 29 above, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:602, para 2.  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., para 5. 
45 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Inizan, note 29 above, ECLI:EU:C:2003:43, para 2. 
9 
 
she sought permission from her French health insurer to receive multidisciplinary treatment in 
a clinic in Berlin. Her request for prior authorisation was refused on the basis that there were 
sufficient treatment options available in France.46 Furthermore, the proposed treatment in 
Berlin would not be equally effective, because her chronic condition required long-term and 
continuous monitoring which could not be provided by a healthcare provider established in 
another Member State.47 In Leichtle, the patient was a civil servant who worked for the Federal 
Labour Office in Germany. Mr Leichtle wanted to travel to Italy for a thermal cure in Ischia, 
and applied for prior authorisation to be reimbursed for his treatment there. His request was 
supported by a medical doctor in Germany.48 Mr Leichtle had been suffering from chronic back 
pain and polyarthralgia. The medical report stated that he had exhausted treatment in Germany, 
that he required in-patient rehabilitation and that the fango baths and radon treatments available 
in Ischia would be particularly effective.49 His request was refused because he had not 
established that thermal cures available in Germany had been unsuccessful, and because a 
significant number of treatments which had proved to be effective for similar illnesses were 
available in German health spas. Mr Leichtle’s appeal against the refusal was rejected because 
the relevant German legislation provided that it had to be ‘absolutely necessary that the cure 
be provided outside Germany in order to have the greatest prospect of success’.50  
The first – and only – patient case to reach the CJEU from the United Kingdom was the case 
of Watts. Mrs Watts had arthritis and required a hip replacement. She was hoping to receive 
surgery. However, when she went to see a consultant in the UK, she was told that she was as 
deserving of a hip replacement as other patients with arthritis in the UK and that she would 
have to wait for about a year.51 On that basis, her request for prior authorisation to receive 
surgery in France was refused. She started legal proceedings and, in the course of the 
proceedings, travelled to France to be assessed by a French surgeon. This surgeon 
recommended that she receive surgery within a few months.52 As a result of his report, Mrs 
Watts was again seen by a consultant in the UK, who concluded that her situation was semi-
urgent and that she required a hip replacement within a couple of months. This report did not 
explicitly support the treatment of Mrs Watts in France, but simply recognised that her medical 
condition had become more urgent. Despite this increased urgency, a renewed request for prior 
authorisation was rejected because the length of the waiting list was in line with the NHS Plan 
targets.53 Mrs Watts decided to travel to France anyway and paid for the treatment herself. 
C. Further Developments (2006-2014) 
Case number Patient’s Name Urgent? Life-
threatening? 
Support from 
Medical 
Doctor? 
C-466/04 Acereda Herrera NO YES YES 
C-444/05 Stamatelaki YES YES NO 
C-173/09 Elchinov YES YES YES 
C-430/12 Luca YES YES YES 
C-268/13 Petru YES YES NO 
                                                            
46 Ibid., para 4. 
47 Ibid., para 6. 
48 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Leichtle, note 29 above, ECLI:EU:C:2003:406, para 2. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, para 4. 
51 Secretary of State for Health v R (on the application of Yvonne Watts) [2004] EWCA Civ 166, paras 11-12. 
52 Ibid., para 16. 
53 Ibid., para 13. 
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Mr Acereda Herrera was a Spanish patient who was urgently admitted to a Spanish hospital, 
where he was diagnosed with lung cancer.54 Because the medical treatment that he received in 
Spain was inadequate, Mr Acereda Herrera applied for prior authorisation under Regulation 
1408/71 to receive treatment in Paris. His Spanish health insurer granted prior authorisation 
and, in the course of one year, Mr Accereda Herrera travelled to Paris on a number of occasions 
for medical treatment.55 As a result, his case is one of the few cases brought before the CJEU 
in which prior authorisation had been granted. The focus of his case was on the question of 
whether he could also receive reimbursement for the travel and accommodation costs that he 
and his family members had incurred when they travelled from Spain to France. In Stamatelaki, 
Mrs Stamatelaki brought a case in the name of her deceased husband, Mr Stamatelakis. Mr 
Stamatelakis, a Greek national, had been diagnosed with bladder cancer. Because his cancer 
was rapidly advancing,56 he decided to obtain medical treatment in the UK. He did not apply 
for prior authorisation and there is no indication that his decision was supported by a medical 
doctor in Greece. For a period of over a month, he received medical treatment in a private 
hospital in London – the London Bridge Hospital. The total costs of his treatment were GBP 
13,600.57 On his return to Greece, Mr Stamatelakis – and, after his death, his widow – claimed 
reimbursement of the costs from his Greek health insurer. The health insurer refused to 
reimburse him because the relevant Greek legislation provided that treatment in private 
hospitals could not be reimbursed, except for children under the age of 14.58 
The last trio of cases before the CJEU came from two of the Member States that joined the EU 
in 2004 – the first case was from Bulgaria, the second and third from Romania. Mr Elchinov, 
a Bulgarian national, was diagnosed with cancer in his right eye. His treating doctor in Bulgaria 
advised that the most effective way to treat the tumour was through laser therapy – more 
precisely, through ‘treatment consisting of the attachment of radioactive plates or proton 
therapy’.59 No such treatment was available in Bulgaria. The only treatment that could be 
provided in Bulgaria would involve the complete removal of his eyeball. For that reason, his 
doctor advised Mr Elchinov to receive treatment in a clinic in Berlin. Mr Elchinov applied for 
prior authorisation to receive treatment in Germany. Because of the medical urgency, Mr 
Elchinov did not wait for the decision and went to Berlin for the treatment. The Administrative 
Court of Sofia held that Mr Elchinov was entitled to reimbursement. However, on appeal, the 
Supreme Administrative Court held that Mr Elchinov was not entitled to reimbursement, 
because the treatment that he had received in Germany was not available in Bulgaria.60 As a 
result, it could not be held to be covered by the Bulgarian healthcare system.  
Ms Luca was a Romanian patient who was diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2008.61 She 
applied for prior authorisation from her Romanian health insurer to receive treatment in 
Vienna. Prior authorisation was duly granted and Ms Luca was successfully treated in Vienna. 
On her return to Romania, her health insurer refused to reimbursement her for all the costs, but 
only provided partial reimbursement on the ground that Ms Luca should have applied for 
reimbursement after she had received the treatment in Vienna. This decision was upheld by the 
                                                            
54 Judgment of the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Cantabria of 5 October 2006, ECLI:ES:TSJCANT:2006:212. 
55 Acereda Herrera, note 29 above, paras 18-20. 
56 E-mail correspondence with lawyer from the Legal Service of the European Commission (1 March 2018). 
57 Stamatelaki, note 29 above, para 9. 
58 Ibid., para 11. 
59 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon in Elchinov, note 15 above, ECLI:EU:C:2010:336, para 10. 
60 Elchinov, note 15 above, para 17, 
61 News report in Desteptarea of 2 September 2014: https://www.desteptarea.ro/bolnava-de-cancer-care-a-
pierdut-procesul-cu-cas-a-ajuns-la-cedo.  
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Romanian court at first instance.62 However, the Court of Appeal of Bacau decided to make a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU. Ms Petru was also a Romanian patient. She suffered from 
a serious cardiovascular illness, for which she was treated in a hospital in Timisoara. After a 
number of years, her illness started to develop rapidly and she urgently required open-heart 
surgery.63 The mitral valve had to be replaced and she also required two stents. While she was 
waiting for the surgery in Timisoara, she discovered that the hospital had a lack of basic 
medical supplies, such as painkillers.64 Furthermore, the hospital had admitted three times more 
patients than its number of beds. As a result, Ms Petru became worried about the adequacy and 
safety of her medical treatment and decided to apply for prior authorisation to receive treatment 
in a hospital in Germany. Authorisation was refused by her Romanian health insurer because 
effective medical treatment was available in Romania.65 Nevertheless, Ms Petru decided to 
travel to Germany to receive treatment there. On her return, she brought legal proceedings to 
claim reimbursement of the costs of her treatment, which were about 17,700 EUR. 
IV. DIAGNOSIS: A CHARACTERISATION OF THE PATIENT IN FREE 
MOVEMENT LAW 
 
A. The Motives of Patients to Receive Treatment in Another Member State 
The empirical analysis of the case law shows that it is not possible to provide a single, unified 
characterisation of the patient in free movement law. The patient in free movement law seems 
to have two faces. On the one hand, in about half of the cases, the patient was clearly acting 
like a consumer. The treatment abroad was similar to what could be described as a second 
opinion – the patient was dissatisfied with the level of care that was provided in the home 
Member State and decided that it would be better to obtain a second opinion outside the national 
healthcare system. In these cases (8 patients), the medical condition of the patient was not 
urgent.66 Furthermore, the treatment was not life-threatening (7 patients). Müller-Fauré and 
Leichtle provide good examples. In Müller-Fauré, the patient had formed the view that dental 
care in Germany was of a higher level than in the Netherlands.67 For that reason, when she was 
on a holiday in Germany, she seized the opportunity to receive dental care there. There was no 
urgency and she made a well-considered decision to obtain treatment under the German 
healthcare system. Similarly, Mr Leichtle could be regarded as a consumer, who preferred the 
thermal baths in Italy over those in Germany. In a significant number of Member States, the 
medical nature of his proposed treatment in Italy would be questioned. Nevertheless, Mr 
Leichtle’s request for prior authorisation was supported by a medical doctor in Germany.68 In 
both cases, a rational and well-considered choice was made to receive medical treatment in 
another Member State. 
A second category – again about half of the cases – shows a different picture. In these cases, 
the medical condition of the patient required urgent treatment (6 patients). Moreover, the illness 
was life-threatening (7 patients). Therefore, the patient was not in a position to think long and 
hard about the possibility of medical treatment in another Member State. In many of these 
cases, the treatment that was being sought in another Member State was fundamentally 
different from the treatment that could be provided in the home Member State. In a way, this 
                                                            
62 Luca, note 29 above, para 13. 
63 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon in Petru, note 16 above, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2023, para 5. 
64 Ibid., para 6. 
65 Ibid., para 7. 
66 In two of the non-urgent cases, the condition of the patient was life-threatening. 
67 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Müller-Fauré , note 29 above, ECLI:EU:C:2002:602, para 2. 
68 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Leichtle, note 29 above, ECLI:EU:C:2003:406, para 2. 
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is not surprising – after all, a Member State only has to grant prior authorisation for medical 
treatment in another Member State if the same or equally effective medical treatment is not 
available in the home Member State. As such, in these cases, the other Member State’s 
healthcare system offered an opportunity that simply did not exist in the home Member State. 
In cases where patients required urgent treatment and where their illness was life-threatening, 
it cannot be said that they were acting like a consumer. These cases were characterised by a 
fundamental lack of choice – if the patient did not travel abroad, they would either die or they 
would be prevented from the possibility of a cure which was not available in their home 
Member State. The pressure these patients were under is evidenced by the fact that many of 
them were not in a position to wait for the decision of their insurer or public authority in their 
home Member State. Peerbooms and Elchinov are the best examples. In the Netherlands, Mr 
Peerbooms would not have been offered any kind of further medical treatment. This decision 
was based on his age and on the fact that the proposed treatment was experimental.69 The 
hospital in Innsbruck was prepared to offer him a treatment – and the prospect of waking up 
from his coma – which the Dutch healthcare system was not able to provide. In those 
circumstances, it is not surprising that he – or rather his family and his neurologist – wanted 
(him) to receive treatment in Austria. His situation was not too different from that of Mr 
Elchinov, who travelled to Berlin to receive laser treatment on the tumour behind his eye ball. 
Again, this was a kind of treatment that was not available in Bulgaria and that was more 
effective and safer – it would mean that his eye ball would not have to be removed – than what 
could be offered in Bulgaria.70 In both cases, the initiative to receive medical treatment in 
another Member State was taken by the doctor who was treating the patient. The patient was 
not a pro-active consumer who had explored various treatment options and who had finally 
reached the conclusion that the best treatment available could be found abroad. On the contrary, 
the patient was very much in the hands of the doctor, who positively encouraged – and, in 
Peerbooms, even applied for prior authorisation to receive – medical treatment abroad.  
B. The Role of the Medical Profession in Free Movement Cases 
This is probably the most striking outcome of the empirical analysis: in more than half of the 
cases (8 patients), the patient was actively supported in their request to receive medical 
treatment abroad by the doctor who was treating them in their home Member State. Often, it 
was even the doctor who took the initiative to seek medical treatment in another Member State. 
This is the best evidence of the fact that the patient was not acting like a consumer, but that 
they were still very much relying on the expertise of their doctor. By contrast, a process of 
consumerisation of the patient involves the emancipation of the patient – the patient genuinely 
becomes more independent from the doctor. This is because the patient is in a position to 
independently obtain information about their diagnosis and about the possible treatment 
options. As a result, the patient relies less on the doctor in making their decisions. The majority 
of free movement cases do not support this consumerist perspective. The initiative for the 
treatment was often taken by the doctor, or the doctor at least strongly supported the request 
for prior authorisation to receive medical treatment abroad. These cases were not about patients 
emancipating from their doctor, but they were still very much about the patient relying on the 
expertise of the doctor. It is clear that free movement of patients is often initiated by the medical 
profession. It provides an opportunity to the medical profession to show to the State or to the 
health insurers that are responsible for reimbursing healthcare that high-quality care is provided 
in another Member State, and that this treatment is offering something to their patients which 
they currently cannot get in their own Member State. As such, the possibility of free movement 
                                                            
69 Judgment of the District Court of Roermond of 6 December 2001, ECLI:NL:RBROE:2001:AD9781. 
70 Elchinov, note 15 above, paras 16-17. 
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of patients provides the medical profession with a tool of confrontation. National healthcare 
systems are required to react to what is happening in another Member State, and they have to 
engage with the substance of the medical treatment that is provided in another Member State. 
The possible reactions from national healthcare systems will be analysed in more detail in the 
next section. Elchinov was a case where free movement of patients was used by a Bulgarian 
doctor to confront the Bulgarian healthcare system with a treatment that was being provided in 
Germany, and that offered a higher prospect of success – and the possibility for patients to keep 
their eyeball – compared to what could be offered under the Bulgarian healthcare system. Free 
movement law provided the tool to argue that, despite the fact that the treatment was not 
available in Bulgaria, it was still covered by the Bulgarian healthcare system. It forced the 
Bulgarian healthcare system to engage with the type and quality of medical treatment that was 
provided in another Member State. As a result, free movement law forced a national healthcare 
system to “open up” to approaches adopted in other Member States.71 
The possibility of free movement of patients is not only used by doctors to provoke a reaction 
from the State or from health insurers – in other words, from those who are responsible for the 
organisation of the healthcare system and for the reimbursement of the costs of healthcare. In 
addition, free movement of patients is used to encourage discussion within the medical 
profession itself. In the last decades, and influenced by developments in the United States, the 
medical profession has put much more emphasis on evidence-based medicine.72 This has not 
been an entirely independent decision on the part of the medical profession – insurers and 
public bodies have also started to put more pressure on doctors to justify why a particular 
treatment is necessary. As a consequence, professional standards and guidelines adopted by the 
medical profession have to rely to a significant extent on scientific evidence.73 The pressure to 
rely on scientific evidence can lead to discussion within the medical profession. Although 
evidence-based medical treatment has to be based on scientific research, the results of scientific 
research are often open to multiple interpretations. Free movement of patients serves as a tool 
to medical doctors to confront another group with a different kind of treatment, and possibly 
with a different kind of interpretation of what constitutes evidence-based treatment. As such, 
free movement law enables medical professionals to challenge existing interpretations of 
medical evidence in their home Member State and encourages a process of internationalisation 
of medical opinion.74 Similar to the impact of Elchinov, this does not automatically mean that 
medical treatment will always be provided in accordance with the highest possible standards, 
but it does mean that medical professionals and national healthcare systems are encouraged to 
exchange their interpretations of medical evidence. In Peerbooms, both the doctor who was 
treating Mr Peerbooms and the independent expert appointed by the Dutch court were of the 
opinion that Mr Peerbooms should be given the chance to receive neuro-stimulation treatment 
in Innsbruck. The ruling of the CJEU, which held that decisions on prior authorisation had to 
be taken on the basis of international scientific evidence, enabled the doctors to confront their 
colleagues with the view of the medical profession in other Member States, and to initiate a 
discussion among their colleagues. As we will see below, this does not necessarily mean that 
views are changed, but it does mean that an obligation is imposed on the doctors who represent 
                                                            
71 B. van Leeuwen, ‘The doctor, the patient and EU law: the impact of free movement law on quality standards 
in the healthcare sector’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 638, 652-653. 
72 For more background see S Straus and others, Evidence-based medicine: how to practise and teach EBM 
(Elsevier, 2010). 
73 See B van Leeuwen, European Standardisation of Services and its Impact on Private Law (Hart Publishing, 
2017), Chapter 4. 
74 See M. Flear, note 11 above, 250. 
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the majority view in a particular Member State to justify why their position is correct.75 This 
can only improve the quality and the evidence-based nature of medical treatment. 
C. The Relationship Between the Moving Patient and the Non-Moving Patient 
The criticism of free movement of patients also has a strong social component: free movement 
law appears to favour those patients who are financially independent. Their financial 
independence enables them to make choices which are good for themselves, but which do not 
necessarily help patients who do not have the financial means to move abroad and who are 
reliant on their national healthcare system. The fact that the moving patients subsequently 
claimed reimbursement from their national healthcare system meant that money had to be paid 
to a different healthcare system, which would otherwise have been paid into the home 
healthcare system.76 As such, patients who stay at home allegedly suffer from free movement 
of patients, since financial resources are being shifted to other Member State’s healthcare 
systems. On a first impression, this criticism appears to be justified. In most of the analysed 
cases, the patient was sufficiently financially independent to decide to receive medical 
treatment abroad. This  made it possible for the patient to travel abroad to receive treatment 
despite the fact that the national healthcare system or health insurer had not (yet) granted prior 
authorisation to receive treatment in another Member State.77 It has already been shown above 
that the financial independence from the national healthcare systems did not necessarily mean 
that patients also made decisions independently from the medical profession in their home 
Member State. Often, they relied on the judgement of their treating doctor in seeking treatment 
abroad. Still, the patients travelled to another Member State – they simply wanted to get better 
and they believed that they had a higher chance of getting cured abroad. There are no 
indications that there was in any way an altruistic motive behind the free movement of patients. 
However, even though the motives of patients may be purely selfish, the exercise of free 
movement rights by patients does create a link between the moving and non-moving patient. 
This link is created through the process of claiming reimbursement. It will be recalled that 
patients are only entitled as a right derived from EU law to receive medical treatment in another 
Member State if the treatment is covered by their home healthcare system or health insurance 
policy. As a result, in claiming that reimbursement should be awarded, the patient is making a 
broader claim about the scope of the coverage of their national healthcare system or insurance 
policy. This claim has an impact on all patients – not just on those patients who are financially 
able to move abroad for medical treatment.78 This can be explained most convincingly by 
reference to Elchinov. Mr Elchinov claimed that the laser treatment which was not available in 
Bulgaria was covered by his Bulgarian health insurance. The fact that Mr Elchinov was able to 
travel abroad and pay for the treatment himself, subsequently enabled him to make this claim 
before the Bulgarian courts. In other words, Mr Elchinov’s financial investment in the medical 
treatment in Germany made it possible for him to claim that the treatment was covered by the 
Bulgarian healthcare system. When the CJEU found that the treatment could indeed be held to 
be covered by the Bulgarian system – even though it was not available in Bulgaria – the result 
was that all Bulgarian patients were entitled to receive this medical treatment, whether in 
Bulgaria or abroad. Mr Elchinov’s financial investment in the German system was ultimately 
an investment in the Bulgarian healthcare system, because it made it possible for non-moving 
patients to receive the same kind of treatment. Someone with the financial independence of Mr 
Elchinov was necessary to make this treatment available to all Bulgarian patients. In a way, it 
                                                            
75 Ibid. 
76 Newdick, note 2 above. 
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could be argued that he acted like an explorer for his national healthcare system.79 Although 
he did not act for social or altruistic reasons, the outcome of his actions was to improve the 
position of the non-moving patient in Bulgaria. A similar outcome can be seen in Watts. 
Because Mrs Watts was not willing to wait for the NHS’ waiting lists and decided to pay for 
surgery in France, she put pressure on the NHS to change its policy on waiting lists. In the end, 
the NHS decided to create more flexibility in the management of waiting lists.80 Furthermore, 
it decided to actively send patients abroad for medical treatment. As a result, although it looked 
like Mrs Watts had got involved in some – very uncharacteristic for the English – queue-
jumping, in fact she improved the position of other patients on the waiting lists. Her financial 
independence made this possible. Overall, therefore, free movement of patients – even if it 
does not take place for altruistic motives – creates a link between the moving patient and the 
non-moving patient. The effect of the exercise of free movement rights by financially 
independent patients is that patients also benefit at the domestic level. As such, the solidarity 
between moving and non-moving patients is improved through the process of reimbursement 
in the home Member State, which has a positive effect on the quality of healthcare provided to 
patients beyond the case of the individual patient. 
V. PROGNOSIS: THE IMPACT OF THE MOVING PATIENT ON NATIONAL 
HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS 
In the final part of the analysis, our focus will shift from the characteristics of the patient to the 
impact of the moving patient on national healthcare systems. This means that it is no longer 
sufficient to focus only on the characteristics of the patient; it is also necessary to analyse the 
reaction of national healthcare systems to free movement of patients. In order to be able to do 
this, the outcome of free movement cases has to be investigated. As such, the empirical 
perspective on the moving patient will be supplemented with an empirical analysis of what 
happened after the judgments of the CJEU. This analysis has not been undertaken for every 
case included in this article. Rather, the aim is to identify patterns based on a detailed analysis 
of the outcome of four cases: Peerbooms, Watts, Elchinov, and Petru. It will be argued that 
there are three different patterns of reactions that free movement of patients can provoke. First, 
it can lead to no real changes in the national healthcare system. In other words, the ‘status quo’ 
is maintained.81  Second, national healthcare systems can react positively to free movement 
and introduce positive changes in the national healthcare system after the free movement of 
patients. This could be described as a ‘learning process’ as a result of free movement of 
patients. Third, it can lead to a negative reaction by the national healthcare system. Free 
movement of patients is rejected and restricted. Each of these patterns will now be analysed in 
more detail. 
A. Maintaining the Status Quo 
One of the reactions of national healthcare systems to free movement of patients could be to 
not make any changes to the entitlements of patients at all. If the finding of the CJEU was that 
                                                            
79 Ibid., 652. 
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the treatment was covered by the home Member State’s healthcare system, but that the 
treatment abroad was more effective or could be provided more quickly, the Member State has 
to accept that it is possible for patients to receive this treatment in another Member State. If 
they do not react to this finding of the CJEU, it means that in future cases they will continue to 
have to grant prior authorisation to these patients and to reimburse the costs of the treatment 
abroad. Depending on the regime chosen for prior authorisation, this could mean that patients 
are not required to pay for the treatment abroad themselves and that payment can be made 
directly by their national healthcare systems or health insurers. As a result, the case before the 
CJEU paved the way for more patients to receive the treatment in another Member State. Since 
there has not been a reaction by the Member State, patients know that they are now also entitled 
to receive this treatment. Although their individual circumstances always have to be taken into 
account – and this may have an impact on the urgency of their situation –, the basic rule is that 
the treatment abroad is now available. This is what happened in Bulgaria after Elchinov. After 
the preliminary reference before the CJEU, it became clear that the treatment that Mr Elchinov 
had received in Germany was covered by the Bulgarian healthcare system and that he was 
entitled to reimbursement of the costs. At that point, three options were open to the Bulgarian 
State. First of all, they could keep the rules and the entitlements of patients under the national 
healthcare system as they were. This would mean that patients continued to be entitled to 
receive the same kind of treatment Mr Elchinov had received in other Member States. A second 
reaction could be to accept that, since the treatment was now held to be covered by the 
Bulgarian healthcare system, the laser treatment should also be provided in Bulgaria. As such, 
it could lead to the ‘import’ of the medical treatment in Bulgaria. Thirdly, the CJEU’s decision 
that the laser treatment was covered by the Bulgarian healthcare system could provoke a 
negative reaction by the Bulgarian authorities. It could lead to a change to the entitlements of 
Bulgarian patients under the national healthcare system, so that it was clear that the treatment 
was not covered by the Bulgarian system. If this happened, it would mean that patients would 
no longer be entitled to receive the treatment abroad. 
In Bulgaria, the status quo was maintained. The treatment which Mr Elchinov had received in 
Germany is still unavailable in Bulgaria. It has not led to a situation where Bulgarian doctors 
are now also providing the treatment. However, the Bulgarian State has not expressly excluded 
the treatment from the entitlements of Bulgarian patients either.82 As a result, it is still possible 
for Bulgarian patients to receive the treatment in another Member State and to be reimbursed 
for it by the Bulgarian healthcare system.83 In fact, Elchinov has resulted in an increase of free 
movement of patient cases in Bulgaria.84 The negative reaction by the Bulgarian State which 
had been feared by many commentators has not occurred. This may have been the result of the 
low number of patients who have moved abroad for medical treatment, but it remains a fact 
that, through his free movement case, Mr Elchinov has created an opportunity for other 
Bulgarian patients to receive high-quality treatment in another Member State. Because no 
changes have been made to the entitlements of patients under the national healthcare system, 
the possibility of cross-border treatment remains open and remains a realistic opportunity for 
patients whose prospects of improvement under the Bulgarian system are lower. Although we 
should be careful to draw general conclusions from Elchinov, the case does show that Member 
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States are unwilling to explicitly restrict the entitlements of patients as a result of free 
movement of patients cases.  
B. Learning from the Healthcare Provided in Another Member State 
Because the number of cases in which patients sought reimbursement for medical treatment 
abroad is quite low, maintaining the status quo is the most likely scenario after a free movement 
case. However, free movement of patients could also provoke a positive reaction by the home 
healthcare system. This reaction could be in two different ways: first, free movement of patients 
could lead to a situation where the treatment would now be provided in the home Member State 
(the ‘import’ of the treatment already referred to above). This could be because it is recognised 
that the treatment provides a higher chance of improvement for patients and should, therefore, 
be available in the home Member State. It could also be imported for more pragmatic reasons: 
if the treatment is covered by the national healthcare system, it might be more efficient to 
provide the treatment under the national healthcare system than to have to spend money on 
another Member State’s healthcare system. Second, the Member State could decide to 
‘embrace’ the possibility of free movement of patients by pro-actively sending patients abroad 
for medical treatment. Again, this would be based on the recognition that patients could get 
something in another Member State which they were not able to get under their national 
healthcare systems. Depending on the type of national healthcare system, this could mean that 
the healthcare system or health insurer would decide to send patients to another Member State 
for treatment. In both scenarios, the home Member State accepts that the treatment (or the 
quality of treatment) provided in another Member State should also be provided in the home 
Member State, or that the home Member State’s healthcare system is responsible for 
guaranteeing that patients have access to this treatment abroad. As such, it can be said that the 
home Member State has engaged in a learning process based on the medical treatment provided 
in another Member State – the type and quality of medical treatments that patients receive is 
improved as a result of the exercise of free movement rights.  
This is precisely what happened in the UK after Watts. After the case of Mrs Watts, the NHS 
decided to pro-actively send patients to France for knee operations on a regular basis because 
of the length of the waiting lists in England.85 As such, embracing free movement becomes a 
possible scenario in situations where medical treatment is not available without undue delay in 
the home Member State. This is not a situation where it would be necessary to import the 
medical treatment into the home Member State – after all, it is already being offered there. 
However, the delay caused by the length of waiting lists makes it necessary to embrace free 
movement. Again, this is both for effectiveness and efficiency reasons – it means that patients 
are being treated earlier, and it also makes it possible for the home Member State to control the 
expenditure on other Member State’s healthcare systems. Overall, the learning exercise in these 
cases is not so much focussed on new types of treatment – i.e. on quality of healthcare – but 
more on the efficiency with which medical treatment is provided. It could also impose an 
obligation on the national healthcare system to look more pro-actively at treatment options in 
the home Member State itself. This could be the result of Petru, in which the CJEU held that 
patients have a right to receive medical treatment abroad if, because of a lack of basic medical 
supplies, the medical treatment in the home Member State would not be adequate.86 However, 
this right would only arise if no adequate treatment could be provided in the entire Member 
State – not just in the hospital where the patient was being treated. As a consequence, if Ms 
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Petru could not be adequately treated in Timisoara, the Romanian healthcare system had to find 
a different hospital for her in Romania where she could receive adequate medical treatment. It 
was only if the entire national healthcare system was unable to provide adequate medical 
treatment, that free movement became a legitimate option.87 The Romanian national court still 
has not given its judgment after the preliminary reference before the CJEU.88 However, it is 
clear that the free movement of patients in this case forced the national healthcare system to 
engage in another type of comparative exercise. This exercise would not involve the 
comparison of the treatment in another Member State with what could be offered in the home 
Member State, but it would force the national healthcare system to engage in a comparative 
exercise to investigate what quality of care could be provided in different hospitals in the home 
Member State.89 
C. Rejecting the Healthcare Provided in Another Member State 
The third and final pattern of reaction by a Member State could be to restrict the possibility of 
free movement after the case which had been brought before the CJEU. Although this could 
again happen in different ways, the most likely way for Member States to achieve this 
restriction would be to redefine the entitlements of patients under their national healthcare 
system or health insurance policy. This could be based on a different interpretation of the 
entitlements in the home Member State or through an express limitation or restriction of these 
entitlements. This was the fear of many commentators after the judgment in Elchinov. They 
warned that the broad interpretation of the scope of the free movement rights of patients could 
provoke a negative reaction by Member States that were worried about spending too much 
money on their national healthcare system. Therefore, they could expressly provide that certain 
treatments were not – or no longer – covered by the national healthcare system in order to avoid 
having to reimburse the costs of these treatments in other Member States. Such a rationing 
exercise could be particularly attractive to some of the newer Member States.90 Ultimately, as 
has already been described above, this is not what has happened after Elchinov. More generally, 
there are no indications that Member States have introduced changes to their legislation, or that 
health insurers have restricted the entitlements of patients as a result of free movement of 
patients. Apparently, the financial gains of such a restriction exercise are not sufficient in light 
of the limited number of patients who travel abroad for medical treatment. 
One case which did provoke a negative reaction at the national level was Peerbooms. The main 
issue in this case was whether Mr Peerbooms was entitled to receive intensive neuro-
stimulation treatment under his Dutch health insurance policy. The Dutch health insurer used 
two conditions in deciding which treatments were covered – medical treatment had to be both 
‘necessary’ and ‘normal’.91 It concluded that the treatment that Mr Peerbooms wanted to 
receive in Innsbruck was experimental and not sufficiently evidence-based. The CJEU 
accepted that the criterion of “normal treatment” could be used. However, it also held that what 
constituted normal treatment had to be decided in light of international scientific evidence. The 
treatment had to be ‘sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science’.92 As a result, 
the Dutch court had to decide whether the treatment was normal on the basis of an assessment 
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of international scientific evidence. Initially, when Mr Peerbooms’ case was brought before the 
Dutch court, the experts had based themselves on a Dutch report on patients in a vegetative 
state.93 This report was also relied on by the court to refuse reimbursement when the case 
returned to the Netherlands after the judgment of the CJEU. However, on appeal, the Centrale 
Raad van Beroep held that the lower court had relied exclusively on the opinion in Dutch 
medical science.94 Therefore, the appeal was allowed since the court should have assessed the 
evidence from an international perspective. The Centrale Raad van Beroep asked the experts 
to explicitly address the question whether there was international scientific evidence to suggest 
that neuro-stimulation therapy could lead to patients waking up from their coma.95 The experts 
looked at PubMed, the main international database for medical scientific publications, and 
analysed a number of American and Canadian studies. In the end, the conclusion was that 
neuro-stimulation therapy was not (yet) evidence-based and that there were no studies which 
proved that the treatment was successful. The Centrale Raad van Beroep also noted that the 
professor who had been providing the treatment in Innsbruck for many years had not been able 
to provide scientific evidence to confirm the positive effects of the treatment.96 As a result, Mr 
Peerbooms was not awarded reimbursement of the costs of the treatment. 
This case shows that free movement of patients forced the medical profession in the home 
Member State to engage in a more internationally focussed assessment of the available 
scientific evidence. Even though the Dutch medical profession ultimately rejected the 
possibility of neuro-stimulation therapy – which meant that it was not covered by Mr 
Peerbooms’ health insurance –, they could only do this on the basis of a broader assessment of 
the scientific evidence. As such, free movement law encourages a dialogue between and within 
healthcare systems, and between different interpretations of scientific evidence.97 Because of 
the lack of scientific evidence, the Dutch system was entitled to refuse reimbursement for this 
treatment. From a general point of view, it is important to note that the restriction of free 
movement was based on a well-considered judgment about the quality of the treatment 
provided in another Member State. The rejection of the possibility of free movement was based 
on concerns about the quality of care. This is now also expressly recognised as a ground to 
refuse prior authorisation for medical treatment abroad in the Cross-Border Healthcare 
Directive.98 There have been no cases in which free movement of patients was restricted for 
purely economic reasons. Although this may be because of the low number of patients who 
travel abroad for medical treatment, it is a relevant factor in assessing the impact and 
desirability of free movement of patients. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The overall aim of this paper has been to re-think the primarily negative attitude towards the 
impact of free movement law in the healthcare sector. The analysis has been conducted from a 
bottom-up perspective. By taking the patient in free movement law as a starting point, the 
impact of free movement law ‘in the treatment room’ has been analysed. From this patient-
based perspective, the paper has shown how free movement of patients has led and can 
potentially lead to changes to national healthcare systems. However, free movement law does 
not only have an impact on healthcare systems. It directly affects patients and doctors when 
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they receive and provide medical care. The empirical evidence shows that free movement law 
is not just about the exercise of patient autonomy. The dynamics between patients and doctors 
are more co-operative. Furthermore, free movement law has encouraged the medical profession 
to reconsider existing interpretations of evidence-based medicine.  
The empirical analysis has shown that the characteristics of the patient in free movement law 
cases are more nuanced than what has previously been suggested in the literature. The extent 
to which patients acted like consumers is significantly more limited and free movement of 
patients is often encouraged and driven by the medical profession. It is clear that the number 
of patient cases which have reached the CJEU is low. It cannot be excluded that the low number 
of patients who decided to travel abroad for medical treatment is at least partially the result of 
the negative attitude towards free movement of patients in the literature. This is a field with a 
significant amount of interaction between patients, doctors and the legal profession. In this 
triangular relationship, more can be done to make free movement of patients a realistic option 
for patients who would like to – or who have to – receive a different type of medical treatment 
in another Member State – or who have to receive treatment more speedily than the available 
treatment in their home Member State. In other words, free movement of patients should be 
considered more strategically. Before this can be done, patients and doctors have to be better 
informed about the potential of free movement of patients.  
Patients, doctors and lawyers should be encouraged to increase the dialogue on the role of free 
movement law in the healthcare sector. A more strategic approach to free movement of patients 
would not suddenly turn the patient into a consumer, because any decisions to seek free 
movement should be based on co-operation between doctor and patient. Lawyers have an 
important role to play in advising the medical profession – and potentially also patients and 
patient associations – about the limits of national healthcare systems or health insurance 
policies, and about the ways in which the entitlements of patients under their national 
healthcare systems can be interpreted in such a way that free movement is made possible. If 
the cooperation between these parties is more effective, free movement of patients can be used 
more frequently as a tool to improve the quality of healthcare that is available to patients across 
the EU.   
 
